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LIBERTIES IN THE ERA OF 
THE SECURITY 
REVOLUTION 
Richard C.C. Peck, Q.C.* 
Nikos Harris** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A modern democracy is dependent upon the existence of a solid majority of 
free-thinking citizens. A democracy falters, if not fails, when its populace 
becomes too willing to accept uncritically the propriety of repressive 
governmental measures aimed at confronting evil. It is at this point that 
legislative actions, deemed expeditious and warranted, have the potential to 
overtake and repress individual rights. Such events, not unknown to modern 
society, largely occur at the confluence of fear and freedom. In his message to 
Congress on January 6, 1941, Franklin Roosevelt expressed the ideal of 
freedom in these lofty terms: 
… we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The 
first is freedom of speech and expression — everywhere in the world. The second 
is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way — everywhere in the 
world. The third is freedom from want … everywhere in the world. The fourth is 
freedom from fear … anywhere in the world.1 
Democracies are fragile institutions. Ultimately they remain strong only if 
their legislators, and more importantly their courts, are courageous in times of 
strife and fear. While the notion of freedom is somewhat ethereal it is rooted in 
the acts of countless individuals throughout history and bottomed in a quest for 
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justice, personal freedom, and self-fulfillment. Democracy is essential to 
ensuring justice while, at the same time, forbidding injustice. As the American 
theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr stated: “Man’s capacity for justice makes 
democracy possible, but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy 
necessary.”2  
Human fear is an instinctive and evolutionary emotion, dedicated to survival. 
In this sense, it is atavistic. It is a truism that only the dead are without fear. 
Freedom, on the other hand, is the embodiment of the struggle of the individual 
to be free from the restraints of external authority. History tells us that freedom 
must be guarded from fear. George Orwell demonstrated in his prophetic and 
increasingly relevant work, 1984,3 that fear, especially that visited upon the 
citizenry at the vagary of the state, must be eschewed.  
In every era there will be individuals who stand intrepidly against 
governmental incursions into individual rights. However, such persons are a 
rare breed. As Plato noted: “Thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very 
few.”4 It is increasingly the case in modern western society that the bulwarks 
against such incursions are, and must be, the courts. By dint of their appointed 
positions, the courts of our country are constitutionally vested with not only the 
ability, but the duty, to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms that define 
democracies. Our judges are expected, and required, to be courageous.  
What follows is an examination of the likelihood that our courts, and 
particularly our Supreme Court, will meet the challenge of preserving our 
liberty interests in the post-September 11, 2001 anti-terrorism era. It is our view 
that there are numerous indicators that the Supreme Court will act to curb 
excessive state interference with individual liberties in this period where no less 
than the future of our basic rights and freedoms hang in the balance. 
1. Balancing Liberty and Security 
The application of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms5 to the 
criminal law has taken innumerable forms over the last three decades, from 
motions to exclude evidence to requests for the appointment of counsel. How-
ever, in almost every case, the application of the Charter to the criminal law has 
required the balancing of certain fundamental values. For example, section 7 
abuse of process motions for stays of proceedings balance the protection of the 
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integrity of the justice system with the public interest in there being a final 
determination of an accused’s guilt or innocence.6 Many Charter disclosure 
motions require balancing an accused’s right to make full answer and defence 
with a complainant’s right to privacy or the interests of effective law enforce-
ment.7 
One particular balancing of values that arises in the criminal law Charter ju-
risprudence perhaps more frequently than any other is the weighing of an ac-
cused’s right to privacy with the right of the state to investigate crime and 
maintain public security. This balance, as was held by Dickson J. (as he then 
was) in Hunter v. Southam Inc., dictates when the state is justified in invading 
the zone of privacy that exists around individuals in free and democratic states: 
This limitation on the right guaranteed by section 8, whether it is expressed nega-
tively as freedom from “unreasonable” search and seizure, or positively as an enti-
tlement to a “reasonable” expectation of privacy, indicates that an assessment must 
be made as to whether in a particular situation the public’s interest in being left 
alone by government must give way to the government’s interest in intruding on 
the individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law en-
forcement.8 
This balancing of privacy and security interests not only bottoms section 8 
litigation, but also informs other Charter jurisprudence, including that relating 
to sections 2 and 7 of the Charter.9 
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 necessarily raise the issue 
whether there will be a fundamental rebalancing of liberty and security interests 
that broaden law enforcement powers at the expense of privacy and other indi-
vidual freedoms. The tragedy of that day has caused a global “security revolu-
tion” aimed at protecting against the repetition of such deadly acts, resulting in 
the vast enhancement of state powers to intrude on individual privacy.10 Canada 
has taken aggressive steps in this regard, most notably with the passage of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act.11 
While it is inevitable and warranted that the Canadian state grant itself new 
powers after the events of September 11, 2001, the danger of enduring security 
excesses being implemented in this era is greater than in any other time since 
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the Charter was adopted. The security revolution has the potential to so radi-
cally alter the balancing of Charter interests that significant aspects of our 
criminal justice system, and indeed our society as a whole, could resemble that 
of an authoritarian state. In the short term, the risk of a failure to curtail the 
excesses of the security revolution creates an increased potential for state abuse 
of power. In the longer term, uncurtailed security excesses have the potential to 
do no less than reshape the fabric of our society. As Professor David Paciocco 
has stated in regard to a number of controversial provisions of the Canadian 
Anti-Terrorism Act: 
… the biggest threat posed by this legislation is that it will support a “creeping in-
crementalism” as the government borrows its tools, techniques and novel offences 
to combat less pressing and less exceptional criminal conduct. I fear that this en-
actment will become part of the fabric of the criminal law in this country, unless 
courts are scrupulous and governments conscientious. This statute is not just a 
threat to terrorists, or to those who are wrongly suspected of being terrorists based 
on creed or nationality. … If this enactment becomes in any measure the prototype 
for law reform, it is a threat to all of us.12 
The fragility of our basic freedoms and liberties must not be underestimated. 
Indeed, the abrogation of any one of our fundamental liberties can alter the free 
and democratic nature of our state. Justice Cory in R. v. Storrey13 held that a 
detention standard based on less than a reasonable and probable grounds 
standard could itself undermine our democracy: 
Section 450(1) [now section 495(1)] makes it clear that the police were required to 
have reasonable and probable grounds that the appellant had committed the offence 
of aggravated assault before they could arrest him. Without such an important 
protection, even the most democratic society could all too easily fall prey to the 
abuses and excesses of a police state. In order to safeguard the liberty of citizens, 
the Criminal Code requires the police, when attempting to obtain a warrant for an 
arrest, to demonstrate to a judicial officer that they have reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the offence. In the 
case of an arrest made without a warrant, it is even more important for the police to 
demonstrate that they have those same reasonable and probable grounds upon 
which they base the arrest (emphasis added). 
The Anti-Terrorism Act, through its broad definition of “terrorist activity,” 
its sweeping new offences, its powers of detention without charge and to 
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compel testimony, its vast authority to breach basic privacy rights, and the 
investigatory duties it places on defence counsel, not only raises fundamental 
issues of arbitrary detention, but also implicates the presumption of innocence, 
the right to counsel, solicitor-client privilege, the right to remain silent, and 
judicial impartiality.14 Further, some legal academics view the security 
revolution as having the potential to narrow the constitutional rights of all 
accused persons to the point of permitting police officers to have a general 
power to stop and question individuals on slight suspicion, and the right to 
question all detainees whether or not they have invoked their right to counsel.15 
Inevitably, the question whether our society will experience a fundamental 
rebalancing of individual privacy and liberty rights versus state security 
interests will be answered by the Supreme Court of Canada. A number of lead-
ing Canadian legal academics have written persuasively concerning the direct 
and indirect risks to our most basic liberties and freedoms posed by the security 
revolution in Canada if left unchecked.16 Such a fundamental rebalancing of 
liberty and security interests could unfold in Charter litigation in two basic 
respects: 
A. a perceived need to accord broader powers to law enforcement results in 
a narrowing of constitutional protections to accused persons generally; 
and 
B. increased security concerns cause there to be overly broad deference to 
Parliament regarding its anti-terrorism legislation, resulting in provi-
sions being upheld which clearly do not minimally impair privacy and 
liberty interests. 
2. Approach of Our Supreme Court 
The central question to be addressed in this article is whether the Supreme 
Court will be likely to take a broadly deferential approach to Charter review of 
security legislation and narrow other criminal Charter protections, or whether 
the Court is likely to provide rigorous scrutiny to the legislation to ensure that 
state security measures are not overly broad or unreasonable. For four reasons, 
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which we discuss in detail in the following sections, we believe that the Court 
is likely to take the latter approach. 
(a) Enforcing Minimal Impairment 
The act of curtailing overly broad security provisions or techniques in the 
post-September 11, 2001 era will clearly require the Supreme Court to limit 
state conduct that has the utmost pressing and substantial objectives. However, 
the Court has demonstrated in its Charter jurisprudence that even the most 
pressing objectives will not immunize legislation from being struck down 
where the state uses overly broad means which do not minimally impair 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
In R. v. Smith17 the objective of a seven-year minimum sentence provision 
was nothing less than to protect persons and society as a whole from the 
scourge caused by imported narcotics. As Lamer J. (as he then was) set out in 
R. v. Smith, this objective addressed compelling public interests: 
Those who import and market hard drugs for lucre are responsible for the gradual 
but inexorable degeneration of many of their fellow human beings as a result of 
their becoming drug addicts. The direct cause of the hardship cast upon their 
victims and their families, these importers must also be made to bear their fair share 
of the guilt for the innumerable serious crimes of all sorts committed by addicts 
[who import] in order to feed their demand for drugs.18 
However, despite this pressing objective of the legislation, and determining 
the constitutionality of the legislation in the midst of the North America-wide 
“War on Drugs,” the Court held that the provision’s overly broad scope caused 
it to fail Charter scrutiny. The Court specifically held in R. v. Smith that a 
laudable objective did not provide Parliament with the right to enact a provision 
with indiscriminate effect and which impairs freedoms beyond that which is 
reasonably necessary to meet that objective. 
In RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),19 the Court was again 
confronted with legislation with a pressing objective: protecting persons from 
the serious and widespread health risks of tobacco use. As was described by La 
Forest J. in his dissenting judgment, the public interests which were associated 
with the legislative objective were immense: 
The harm tobacco consumption causes each year to individual Canadians, and the 
community as a whole, is tragic. Indeed, it has been estimated that smoking causes 
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the premature death of over 30,000 Canadians annually … Overwhelming evidence 
was introduced at trial that tobacco use is a principal cause of deadly cancers, heart 
disease and lung disease. In our day and age this conclusion has become almost a 
truism.20 
Despite the fact that the legislation was addressing the fundamental issue of 
the protection of human life, a majority of the Court struck down the 
legislation. The majority held that the provision’s broad infringements on the 
expressive rights of corporate entities failed Charter scrutiny because of the 
absence of specific evidence that these means were necessary to achieve the 
legislation’s objectives.21 Further, the Court specifically warned of the danger 
posed to the fabric of our free and democratic society by excessive judicial 
deference to Parliament. Justice McLachlin (as she then was) held: 
The courts are no more permitted to abdicate their responsibility than is Parliament. 
To carry judicial deference to the point of accepting Parliament’s view simply on 
the basis that the problem is serious and the solution difficult, would be to diminish 
the role of the courts in the constitutional process and to weaken the structure of 
rights upon which our constitution and our nation is founded.22 
There are numerous other examples of the Court striking down legislation, or 
portions of legislation, which contained similarly pressing objectives because 
overly broad or unreasonable means were used to achieve those goals. Such 
legislative objectives have included protecting children from becoming the 
victims of sexual assault or exploitation,23 deterring persons from carrying 
weapons in the commission of offences because of the increased risk of death,24 
and promoting social and racial tolerance in society.25 
The Court has stated on a number of occasions that it is appropriate that 
there be a “constitutional dialogue” between itself and the legislature, and that 
Parliament be permitted flexibility in the means chosen to address its 
objectives.26 However, the Court has also indicated that it is its responsibility to 
specify the Charter standards within which those means must be selected, and 
to declare unconstitutional legislative choices that do not meet those standards 
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regardless of the “popularity” of such determinations.27 The Court further has 
recently twice affirmed that particularly stringent Charter scrutiny will be 
necessary where a legislative provision curtails a particularly important civil 
right or fundamental value of our justice system.28 
While the Charter jurisprudence also includes a number of instances of the 
Court providing certain deference to Parliament in light of the importance of 
the public interest in the issue,29 it is submitted that the Court has clearly 
indicated that a vital legislative objective will not immunize legislation from 
close scrutiny. Further, the Court has indicated that it is prepared to strike down 
legislative provisions that are addressing pressing public interests if the means 
chosen to achieve the objective clearly do not minimally impair fundamental 
rights and freedoms. As McLachlin J. (as she then was) held in RJR-
MacDonald Inc. v. Canada:30 
Even on difficult social issues where the stakes are high, Parliament does not have 
the right to determine unilaterally the limits of its intrusion on the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter …. care must be taken not to devalue the need 
for demonstration of minimum impairment by arguing the legislation is important 
and the infringement of no great moment. 
As noted in the excerpt above, McLachlin J. (as she then was) held that even 
if there is a perceived “minor” infringement of a Charter right or freedom, the 
Court must carefully assess whether that impairment was necessary to achieve 
the provision’s objective. Given the number of fundamental individual liberties 
and freedoms which are being significantly curtailed by Parliament in its 
legislative response to September 11, 2001, it is submitted that the Court will 
be inclined to apply particularly rigorous scrutiny to these measures. 
(b) Unique Canadian Approach 
Another factor that may indicate a likelihood of our Supreme Court to 
partake in rigorous scrutiny of Parliament’s security measures is its willingness 
to formulate significantly different views of constitutional rights from those of 
the American courts. 
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It is yet to be seen how the United States Supreme Court will deal with the 
constitutionality of the new American security measures, such as the sweeping 
new powers contained in the U.S.A. Patriot Act31 of 2001. It is also likely too 
early to tell whether the U.S. Supreme Court will seek to limit the constitutional 
rights of accused persons generally in the post-September 11, 2001 era.32 
However, given that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks took place on 
American soil, that security issues remain at the peak of that nation’s public 
agenda, and the Court’s current conservative majority, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that the U.S. Supreme Court will accord maximum deference to 
legislative measures that enhance the powers of law enforcement and narrow 
individual rights and freedoms.33 
Our Supreme Court, however, has consistently developed its own distinct 
constitutional analysis, and has in a number of instances accorded greater rights 
to accused persons than in American constitutional jurisprudence. While there 
now appears to be almost no constitutional limits on minimum sentences for 
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objective of protecting public safety, that scheme requires that certain repeat offenders, including 
those convicted of minor thefts, be incarcerated for 25 years to life. In Ewing v. California, No. 01-
6978 (U.S.S.C. 2003), a five-to-four majority of the Court held that a sentence of 25 years for a 
repeat offender who was convicted of stealing three golf clubs did not violate the constitutional 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. In the companion case of Lockyer v. Andrade, No. 
011-1127 (U.S.S.C. 2003) the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 50 year sentence provided to a 
repeat offender who was convicted of stealing video tapes. It is also noteworthy that the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently agreed to hear the cases of Fellers v. United States, No. 02-6320 and 
United States v. Patane, No. 02-1183, which will permit the Court to revisit its 1966 Miranda 
ruling concerning warnings that must be provided to a defendant on detention. 
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even minor offences in the United States,34 our Court in R. v. Smith struck down 
a seven year minimum sentence requirement for drug importation.35 While 
constructive murder provisions exist in federal and state jurisdictions 
throughout the United States, our Court definitively held that such provisions 
violate the Charter’s fundamental principles of justice guarantee.36 
Of particular relevance in this regard is our Supreme Court’s courageous 
decision in United States of America v. Burns.37 The Court’s finding in Burns 
that to send any person from Canada to face the death penalty in the United 
States violates section 7 of our Charter both conflicted with, and questioned, 
current American constitutional jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court has not 
only upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty, but has held that it 
properly applies to youth offenders.38 Our Court ruled that for the Canadian 
state to send a person to face the death penalty conflicts with our fundamental 
principles of justice, and further cited unfairness in American capital litigation 
to support its conclusion.39  
Moreover, the Court in Burns also provided a cautious approach to using 
cross-border security issues to justify limiting Charter rights in Canada. In 
response to a submission that a failure to extradite offenders to face the death 
penalty would make Canada a “safe haven” for American capital offenders, the 
Court held:  
International criminal law enforcement including the need to ensure that Canada 
does not become a “safe haven” for dangerous fugitives is a very legitimate objec-
tive, but there is no evidence whatsoever that extradition to face life in prison with-
out release or parole provides a lesser deterrent to those seeking a “safe haven” 
than the death penalty, or even that fugitives approach their choice of refuge with 
such an informed appreciation of tactics. If Canada suffers the prospect of being a 
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  Id.  
35
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  R. v. Vallaincourt, supra, note 24; American Jurisprudence, West Group, 2nd ed. (1999), 
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haven from time to time for fugitives from the United States, it likely has more to 
do with geographic proximity than the Minister’s policy on treaty assurances. The 
evidence as stated is that Ministers of Justice have on at least two occasions (since 
Kindler and Ng) refused to extradite without assurances, and no adverse conse-
quences to Canada from those decisions were brought to our attention (emphasis 
added).40  
The ruling in United States v. Burns accordingly may be a particularly 
important indicator of our Court’s willingness to provide rigorous Charter 
scrutiny to Canada’s new security measures. The decision affirms that our 
Supreme Court will not hesitate to formulate a Charter analysis which is 
explicitly distinct from American constitutional jurisprudence, and further sets 
out that cross-border security issues should only be relevant to Charter analysis 
where there is specific evidence supporting such a justification for limiting 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
(c) Balance in Post-September 11, 2001 Decisions 
Another indicator supporting the likelihood of our Supreme Court to provide 
meaningful Charter review of state security measures in the post-September 11, 
2001 era is found in an assessment of its criminal law Charter decisions in this 
period. 
While it is difficult to generalize, it would appear that the Court since Sep-
tember 11, 2001 has taken a balanced approach to the application of the Charter 
to criminal law. In fact, in this period the Court has affirmed or even expanded 
certain Charter rights of an accused, including affirming limitations on the 
search powers of the state in criminal or quasi-criminal investigations,41 signifi-
cantly expanding the protection of an accused’s rights under section 13 of the 
Charter,42 and affirming that a core value under our Charter is the protection 
against wrongful conviction and that an accused has a broad right to make full 
answer and defence.43 
Further, there are two post-September 11, 2001, criminal law Charter deci-
sions of the Court which may be particularly indicative of the approach that the 
Court will take to the review of the new security provisions. In Lavallee, Rackel 
& Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General),44 the Court struck down section 488.1 
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 Id., at 359-60. 
41
  R. v. Law (2002), 160 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.); R. v. Golden (2001), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 449 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Jarvis (2002), 169 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
42
  R. v. Noël (2002), 168 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.). 
43
  R. v. Shearing (2002), 165 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (S.C.C.). 
44
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of the Criminal Code45 that authorized the search and seizure of materials in 
possession of a lawyer. The Court found that the legislation, on numerous 
grounds, failed to minimally impair solicitor-client privilege, and accordingly 
constituted a breach of section 8 of the Charter which could not be saved by 
section 1. The Court’s decision that Parliament clearly failed to protect against 
unreasonable search and seizure in this instance sent a strong message concern-
ing other legislative provisions that do not minimally encroach on solicitor-
client privilege and confidentiality. Justice Arbour held for the Court: 
Indeed, solicitor-client privilege must remain as close to absolute as possible if it is 
to retain relevance. Accordingly, this Court is compelled in my view to adopt strin-
gent norms to ensure its protection. Such protection is ensured by labeling as un-
reasonable any legislative provision that interferes with solicitor-client privilege 
more than is absolutely necessary (emphasis added).46  
This bold statement from the Court indicates an intention to aggressively 
scrutinize aspects of the new security provisions that encroach on the solicitor-
client relationship, such as those that require counsel to report suspicious finan-
cial transactions of their clients, or to disclose client information about terrorist 
property.47 
In the months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Court 
in R. v. Mentuck48 and R. v. E.(O.N.)49 significantly limited the ability of the 
police to obtain publication bans concerning their operational methods and 
investigative techniques. As Professor Mendes sets out in his article, “Between 
Crime and War: Terrorism, Democracy and the Constitution,”50 these decisions 
provide a strong indication that the Court intends for there to be real public and 
judicial oversight of the post-September 11, 2001 security measures, and that 
                                                                                                                                                              
45
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
46
  Lavellee, Rackel & Heintz, supra, note 28, at 29. 
47
  Paciocco, supra, note 12, at 191-92; Canadian Bar Association, Submissions on Bill C-36 
Anti-terrorism Act (2001), at 29-31. The Court’s decision in R. v. Lavallee, supra, note 28, appears 
to already have had an impact on government legislation that affects the role of legal counsel. On 
March 24, 2003, the Canadian Department of Finance announced that it was repealing provisions of 
the Proceedings of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17, 
which required lawyers to divulge confidential communications with their clients: see Department 
of Finance, News Release, “Government Amends Anti-Money Laundering Regulations Affecting 
Legal Profession,” (24 March 2003), online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/news03/03-020e.html>. 
48
  [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442. 
49
  [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478. 
50
  (2002) 14 N.J.C.L. 71, at 89-90. Professor Mendes also sets out in his article that two post-
September 11, 2001 immigration decisions from the Supreme Court, Suresh v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), and Ahani v. Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship & Immigration) (2002), 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 175 (S.C.C.) indicated a balanced ap-
proach to weighing state security interests and fundamental rights. 
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any limitations on public scrutiny will have to be specifically justified on clear 
evidence. These decisions foreshadow that particularly aggressive scrutiny will 
be accorded to those provisions in the security legislation which propose to 
immunize invasive techniques from public or judicial review.51 As the Court 
held in R. v. Mentuck: 
A fundamental belief pervades our political and legal system that the police should 
remain under civilian control and supervision by our democratically elected offi-
cials; our country is not a police state. The tactics used by police, along with other 
aspects of their operations, is a matter that is presumptively of public concern.52 
It is clear that in the period since September 11, 2001, there have also been 
decisions which have been significantly unfavourable to the rights of the ac-
cused and which have provided deference to Parliament, most notably R. v. 
Hall.53 It is, however, submitted that when looking at the Court’s criminal law 
Charter decisions as a whole in this period, there has not been any distinct trend 
to limit the rights of the accused. In fact, a number of the Court’s decisions 
foreshadow serious constitutional hurdles for many of the controversial aspects 
of the security legislation. 
(d) Tailored Remedies 
One final factor in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that may weigh in fa-
vour of meaningful Charter review of the security legislation involves the 
creative approaches the Court has taken to modifying legislative provisions to 
protect the rights of accused persons. Given the broad threat to human life that 
terrorism poses, and the inevitable acceptance that the state is justified in taking 
certain measures to provide greater public security in this era, it is simply not 
realistic to conceive of the Court striking down entire portions of the frame-
work of the new security provisions. If the Court is boxed into an “all or noth-
ing” option in determining the validity of the post-September 11, 2001 security 
provisions, the prospects for substantive Charter scrutiny would realistically be 
significantly reduced. 
However, the Court has indicated in its recent jurisprudence an ability to 
make substantive changes to legislative schemes that limit their scope without 
having to strike down the provisions as a whole. These targeted Charter reme-
dies have been achieved through means such as progressive interpretation of 
aspects of the legislation, or through striking down certain unreasonable por-
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  Supra, note 26. 
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tions of the provisions. For example in R. v. Mills,54 the Court interpreted nu-
merous aspects of section 278.1 of the Criminal Code to balance an accused’s 
right to full answer and defence and a complainant’s right to privacy in a much 
more equitable manner than was necessarily apparent on the face of the provi-
sions.  
Further, the Court has also shown a willingness to strike down certain provi-
sions within a legislative scheme, or even set out new or expanded defences to 
an accused as part of a Charter remedy.55 Even in the case of R. v. Hall, the 
majority struck down one of the grounds for denying bail in paragraph 
515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, and further used some language to limit the 
breadth of the tertiary ground.56 
While these more limited types of constitutional remedies can sometimes 
appear to be a “compromise” position that do not provide the broadest protec-
tion of an accused’s Charter rights, in light of the serious security issues raised 
by the September 11, 2001 attacks, they may provide the Court with the ability 
to curtail clearly unreasonable aspects of the legislative provisions without 
having to choose between striking down or upholding the new security scheme 
as a whole. 
II. CONCLUSION 
How the Supreme Court will ultimately balance privacy and liberty rights 
versus security interests may still be subject to a number of contingencies, from 
the occurrence of future terrorist attacks on North American soil to evidence of 
the state using its new powers for improper purposes. It is, however, submitted 
that in considering the Supreme Court’s historic and recent record on the appli-
cation of the Charter to criminal law, there are a number of signs that the Court 
will not shy away from its responsibility to rigorously scrutinize the State’s 
post-September 11, 2001 security measures. It is further submitted that there 
are also a number of reasons to believe that the Court will curtail those meas-
ures which clearly do not minimally impair fundamental rights and freedoms.  
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  Supra, note 7. 
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  See for example R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687; R. v. Sharpe, supra, note 9; Little Sisters 
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very strong case against the accused. The majority also set out that “public confidence” must be 
analyzed from the perspective of a reasonable member of the community properly informed about 
Charter values. 
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If and when the Court does act to curb the excesses of the security revolution 
in Canada, these limitations will ultimately not be made in the name of the 
Court or even in the name of the Charter, but will be in the name of the democ-
ratic choice of the Canadian people. The prophetic words of Iacobucci J. in 
Vriend v. Alberta57 will be worth repeating many times through the public and 
judicial debate on the role of the Court in limiting the excesses of the security 
revolution: 
… it should be emphasized again that our Charter’s introduction and the conse-
quential remedial role of the courts were choices of the Canadian people through 
their elected representatives as part of a redefinition of our democracy. Our consti-
tutional design was refashioned to state that henceforth the legislatures and execu-
tive must perform their roles in conformity with the newly conferred constitutional 
rights and freedoms. That the courts were the trustees of these rights insofar as dis-
putes arose concerning their interpretation was a necessary part of this new de-
sign…. Because the courts are independent from the executive and legislature, 
litigants and citizens generally can rely on the courts to make reasoned and princi-
pled decisions according to the dictates of the constitution even though specific de-
cisions may not be universally acclaimed (emphasis added). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
57
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